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The highly visible accounting scandals that surrounded 
the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and several other 
major companies—together with the revelation of fraud 
and other acts of malfeasance by corporate executives—
have aroused public outrage, called into question the 
values and ethics of business leaders, and undermined 
the public’s confidence in public companies.  CED, as a 
public-policy organization in which current and retired 
business leaders play a prominent role, is concerned 
about the reality, as well as the appearance, of corporate 
impropriety.  
  
We are unwavering advocates for the free market 
system, but we are just as firm in our belief that 
businesses and their leaders must earn the public’s trust.  
Perceptions that firms flout rules, behave unethically, 
and use deceptive business processes weaken confidence 
in, and support for, the free enterprise system.   
Executive compensation that is untethered to economic 
value and violates perceptions of fairness leads to 
mistrust and the prospect of a stifling regulatory 
backlash.  The ethical failing of a small number of 
corporate leaders is infectious: it undermines the ethical 
standards of their own firms and affects the behavior of 
others and, therefore, must be cured. 
 
This policy statement addresses governmental and 
corporate policies that affect the behavior of publicly 
traded companies, as well as the confidence of investors 
in them.  We acknowledge at the outset that no laws or 
policies will ever be sufficient to end all corporate 
misbehavior (or, for that matter, misbehavior in any 
segment of public life).  We are confident, however, that 
truly independent and inquisitive boards of directors will 
provide the best safeguard against corporate 
wrongdoing.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
We observe and conclude the following: 
 
(1) Audit Committees Must be Autonomous 
and Vigorous 
 
In order to accurately present a company’s position, the 
board of directors must have access to all pertinent data.  
This will occur only if a board’s audit committee is 
competent, independent, and establishes effective control 
over both the internal auditors and the independent 
outside auditors.  The relationship between the audit 
committee of the board and the outside and  
internal auditors is crucial.  The audit committee should 
exercise the same tone of control over the internal 
auditor as it does over the external auditor, extending to 
decisions of hiring, firing, and compensation. 
(2) Financial Information is Inherently 
Judgmental 
  
Financial statements would be more useful if they were 
governed by fewer rules and displayed more of the 
judgment that lies behind estimated numbers.  Stock 
analysts, the investing public, and regulators must 
recognize the inherently judgmental character of 
accounting statements and financial information.  
Ranges of values rather than precise numbers should be 
explained and understood as such.  In addition, financial 
statements should be supplemented with non-financial 
indicators of value. 
 
(3) Give Sarbanes-Oxley a Chance to Work 
 
CED sees room to tailor the requirements imposed by 
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley within the existing 
statute, and endorses the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) implementation guidance based on 
their evaluation of the first-year experience.  The 
guidance, issued simultaneously by the two agencies in 
May 2005, should lower the costs and increase the value 
of Section 404 compliance.  Moreover, CED does not 
recommend a broad exemption to Sarbanes-Oxley 
requirements for small-capitalization companies, but 
nevertheless supports the objective of mitigating the 
costs to smaller companies. 
 
(4) Excessive Executive Compensation Can 
be Tamed by the Compensation Committee 
 
In CED’s view, the disparity of income between top 
corporate executives and average employees is a cause 
for serious concern.  We are concerned that the 
differentials that exist today too often reflect neither 
market conditions nor individual performance.  The 
procedure for determining executive compensation has 
been broken at far too many of our larger corporations, 
and we believe that the solution to excessive executive 
compensation must be regarded as a matter of process 
and disclosure. 
 
To that end, we make the following recommendations: 
 
• Compensation committees should adopt 
measurable, specific, and genuinely challenging 
goals for the performance of their businesses, 
and judge management by them. 
• The compensation process must be run by 
compensation committees composed of 
independent directors.  And compensation 
consultants, when used, must be entirely 
independent of management.  The compensation 
committee should have direct authority over all 
terms of any management contract, including all 
forms of compensation. 
• Management should have a substantial equity 
interest in their company. 
• Management should make a full, timely, and 
transparent disclosure of its compensation to 
shareholders. 
• Choices of forms of compensation should 
promote the long-term value of the firm, rather 
than exploit favorable accounting or tax 
treatment. 
• Severance compensation, like all other forms of 
executive compensation, should be reviewed 
carefully against criteria set by the compensation 
committee of the board, and the board should 
publicly provide full details of awards and 
explain publicly to shareholders the reasoning 
behind such awards. 
• Companies should have the right to recapture 
top executive bonuses if financial results by 
which they were justified turn out not to have 
been achieved when accounts are restated. 
(5) Directors Must be Selected and 
Appraised by Independent Nominating 
Committees 
 
A paradox of corporate stewardship is that, despite the 
principle that directors represent shareholders in the 
selection and retention of management, historically most 
directors have been selected by management.  In our 
view, the best approach to building high-quality boards 
is to assign to truly independent nominating committees 
the responsibility for recommending new board 
candidates and for evaluating the performance of 
existing board members.  The nominating committee 
should also have the responsibility of recommending 
committee assignments. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Relations between corporations and investors have 
suffered wrenching change in the last five years, from 
both corporate misdeeds and the legislative reaction to 
them.  For all of the damage and pain, the potential 
exists for ultimate benefit to all parties, as better and 
more transparent information breeds renewed investor 
confidence and higher standards of behavior and 
openness. 
 
In this statement, CED has recommended some changes 
in practice to hasten this beneficial adjustment.  
However, we would view such proposed change as 
modest, and within the scope of the recent revisions in 
corporate governance practices.  CED believes that the 
wisest course now would be patience, to allow these new 
practices and institutions to be learned and understood, 
and to demonstrate their merit. 
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